Does it matter in Public Diplomacy terms if an organisation with which you partner is heavily criticised in an official report? This post continues from an earlier post on the British Council’s partnership with weapons manufacturer BAE Systems.
The earlier post focused on the  considerations which must exist alongside the potential benefits of partnership in Public Diplomacy. Specifically, the need to identify those things an organisation will not give up at any price.
In this instance the financial support for British Council programmes provided by BAE systems may have brought with it certain risks to reputation, beyond the possible conflict some may feel exists when a cultural relations organisation, working to increase international understanding and bridge trust gaps in order to create harmony and prosperity for all, partners with a weapons manufacturer. The reputation of the organisation could be at risk as its partner  BAE Systems faces prosecution over bribery allegations.
In addition, the independent review of the 2006 RAF Nimrod crash that killed 14 military personnel has delivered a damning verdict. Among those heavily criticised in the report were BAE Systems. Â The full report was so damning of BAE that I’ve included some of the longer sections below as abbreviation does not do them justice:
- The Nimrod Safety Case was drawn up between 2001 and 2005 by BAE Systems [working with the MOD and QinetiQ]
- The Nimrod Safety Case represented the best opportunity to capture the serious design flaws in the Nimrod which had lain dormant for years. If the Nimrod Safety Case had been drawn up with proper skill, care and attention, the catastrophic fire risks to the Nimrod MR2 fleet presented by the Cross-Feed/SCP duct and the Air-to-Air Refuelling modification would have been identified and dealt with, and the loss of XV230 in September 2006 would have been avoided.
- Unfortunately, the Nimrod Safety Case was a lamentable job from start to finish. …Â BAE Systems bears substantial responsibility for the failure of the Nimrod Safety Case.
- [The Safety Case was]Â riddled with errors of fact, analysis and risk categorisation.
- Further, at handover meetings in 2004, BAE Systems gave the misleading impression to the Nimrod IPT and QinetiQ that the task had been properly completed and could be signed off and deliberately did not disclose to its customer the scale of the hazards it had left “Open†and “Unclassified†(many with only vague recommendations that ‘further work’ was required). The Nimrod IPT and QinetiQ representatives were lulled into a false sense of security. These matters raised question marks about the prevailing ethical culture at BAE Systems.
In contrast, the ‘Training Bridge‘ project run by the British Council and in which BAE Systems participates seeks to
The reality of Public Diplomacy partnerships, whether through the ‘Training Bridge’, UKIERI in India, or exchange programes in Saudi Arabia, is that the large financial resources of corporations such as BAE Systems can increase the reach and impact a Public Diplomacy organisation can achieve. However, these organisations also have their own agenda, methods and organisational culture. As the British Council website notes many of our business partners gain competitive advantage… from these partnerships.
The question for a Public Diplomacy organisation partnering or recieving sponsorship must be whether the increased impact is worth certain other risks.
This leads ultimately to the same conclusion as the previous post on this issue, an organisation must identify things which are not for sale – asking the question posed at the British Council Advisory Board 2007;
- What should we not give up at any price?
High on the list has to be credibility, without which the ability to engage in meaningful interaction with members of other communities and societies will be severely curtailed.